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When God Demands Blood:
Unusual Minds and the Troubled Juridical Ties
of Religion, Madness, and Culpability
RABIA BELT*
“Why is it when we talk to God we’re said to be praying—but when
God talks to us, we’re said to be schizophrenic?”
Lily Tomlin1
The deific decree doctrine allows criminal defendants who believe
that God commanded them to kill to plead not guilty by reason of
insanity to murder. The insanity defense has remained moored to its
Judeo-Christian roots, which has artificially limited its bounds.
While civil law has focused on individualism within religion, criminal
law has imposed state-defined limits on what religion (or socially
acceptable religion) is. This article argues that the deific decree doc-
trine is too closely tied to artificial limits on insanity imposed by
nineteenth-century developments in the mental health profession and
criminal law. The doctrine unacceptably privileges certain mentally
ill criminal defendants whose delusions fit within an outdated model
that is not psychiatrically valid. Moreover, it has disparate gender
consequences that harm women with postpartum psychosis who kill
their children while supporting men who kill their female partners.
The article concludes by calling for the end of the deific decree doc-
trine and expanding the insanity defense so it more accurately tracks
psychiatric understanding of mental illness.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Robert Crenshaw and his wife were on their honeymoon in
Canada in 1982, Robert got into a fight and was deported back to the
United States.2 He found a motel room just across the border in Blaine,
Washington and waited for his wife.3 Upon her arrival two days later,
Robert had the immediate suspicion that she had been unfaithful, that
“‘it wasn’t the same Karen . . . she’d been with someone else.’”4 Robert
“took [his wife] to the motel room and beat her unconscious.”5 He then
went to a store, stole a knife, and stabbed her twenty-four times.6 After
stabbing her, Robert left his now-dead wife, drove to a farm where he
had previously worked, and borrowed an ax.7 When he returned to the
motel room, Robert decapitated Karen.8
After being apprehended by police, Robert voluntarily confessed
and claimed that he thought it was his duty as a Moscovite to kill Karen,
whom he believed had been unfaithful.9 At trial, the court faced a quan-
dary: were Crenshaw’s actions religious or insane?10 And what did the
answer say about his criminal responsibility?11 When Robert was appre-
hended and charged with first-degree murder, he argued that he should
be found not guilty by reason of insanity.12 The case ultimately reached
the Washington Supreme Court, which upheld his first-degree murder
conviction.13 The dilemma divided the justices, who, like so many
jurists before, struggled to draw sensible boundaries and bridges
between faith, madness, and responsibility.14 The legal system was
forced to grapple with a doctrine that was making its reappearance in







9. See id. at 491, 494 (“Crenshaw argued only that he followed the Moscovite faith and that
Moscovites believe it is their duty to kill an unfaithful wife. This is not the same as acting under a
deific command. . . . Crenshaw’s personal ‘Moscovite’ beliefs are not equivalent to a deific decree
and do not relieve him from responsibility for his acts.”).
10. See id. at 491.
11. See id.
12. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.12.010 (West 2011); Crenshaw, 659 P.2d. at 491.
13. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d. at 490.
14. See id. at 498–99, 502.
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criminal trials after a long absence: the doctrine of deific decree.15
Unusual minds that turn violent raise some of the most difficult
questions of criminal responsibility. When aberrant thoughts take on a
religious cast, the problem becomes even more complex, as judges must
determine whether religious fervor has slipped into mental illness and
what impact this mental state has on culpability. This article traces judi-
cial attempts to navigate three paradigms for understanding abnormal
thoughts—religion, psychiatry, and criminal law—by examining the
170-year history of a doctrine predicated upon their collision. The
defense of deific decree holds that if God commanded a defendant to kill
another person, then the defendant can successfully plead not guilty by
reason of insanity to first-degree murder.16 Although the basic statement
of the doctrine has changed little across its long existence, its operation
and underlying theory have shifted considerably as the social, judicial,
and scientific understandings of religion, mental illness, and criminality
between which the doctrine mediates have themselves undergone
transformations.17
Three stages animate this article. First, the emergence and early
articulation of deific decree doctrine (1844–1915) illustrates the extent
to which Christianity bound together judicial and psychiatric notions of
religion, mental illness, and culpability during the formative years of
what came to be the modern insanity defense. Second, in the nearly eight
decades that followed, from 1915 to 1982, the judiciary expanded its
conceptions of insanity and religion in ways that untethered mental ill-
ness, culpability, and religion from Christian norms. These years saw the
deific decree defense recede in deference to more capacious definitions
15. See id. at 494.
16. Murder is defined by degrees. First-degree murder is defined generally as an unjustified
killing manifesting purpose and intent to cause death or a killing during the course of a major
felony. See JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 291 (5th ed. 2004). In
deific decree cases, the defendant is not challenging that he caused the death of another or that he
intended to do so; it is why the defendant caused the death that is at issue. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d
at 494. It is important to note that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is different than an
acquittal by another defense. In an acquittal, the defendant is free to go, while the state can retain
custody of a legally insane defendant until he or she is deemed not a danger to society. See RALPH
SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY IN LAW/LAW IN PSYCHIATRY 217 (2d ed. 2009). Thus, a legally insane
defendant potentially could remain committed longer than he could be imprisoned if found legally
sane and guilty. See id.
17. Though it may seem to be a quirky exception, deific decree has received extensive
discussion in case law and casebooks. See, e.g., Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347, 354 (7th Cir.
2010) (Judge Posner discussing the doctrine of deific decree); Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495,
500–02 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 139 (Colo. 1992); State v.
Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 641 (Conn. 1997); State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1322 (N.J. 1990);
State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889, 904 (Wash. 1988); State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650, 654 (Wash.
1983); GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 215 (3d ed. 2007).
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of insanity. Third, as the insanity defense narrowed following the 1982
acquittal of John Hinckley by reason of insanity for shooting Ronald
Reagan, deific decree defenses reemerged.18 These twinned develop-
ments illuminate the extent to which the Court’s reinterpretation of reli-
gion as a personal choice put faith on a collision course with
culpability—and the free will presumed to underlie it.
The protagonists of this history are the experts. As judges who spe-
cialize in questions of culpability have confronted defendants who per-
ceive otherworldly commands, they have had to make choices about the
extent to which they will draw on and defer to theologians and psychia-
trists. As the mental health field professionalized and courts increasingly
sought to avoid entanglement with religion, judges asked psychiatrists to
carry more of the burden of explanation within the judicial system, and
psychiatrists willingly accepted. Ironically, as psychiatrists increasingly
claimed the ability to map out normal and abnormal human behavior,
their skill at capturing the impact of religion and culture on behavior
diminished. As expert mental-health testimony became pervasive, it pro-
vided ever less guidance to judges seeking to navigate religious compul-
sion and culpability.
Discussing religion as a concern of criminal law rather than as the
subject of First Amendment litigation relieves the tensions that this arti-
cle explores. Too often, baroque First Amendment doctrine encourages
scholars to treat collisions between law and religion as doctrinal
brainteasers solvable through clever analysis rather than as emblematic
of deep, unresolvable tensions. Here, the criminal context makes visible
how legal conceptions of religion respond to and collide with shifts in
popular ideas and expert knowledge. Although modern First Amend-
ment law seeks to construct a firm divide between rationalist legal rea-
soning and humanistic religious faith, this neat dichotomy collapses in
deific decree cases. Courts cannot evaluate deific decree claims without
consideration of defendants’ beliefs. Defendants and their lawyers
encourage this entanglement by renouncing claims that the killer was a
modern-day Joan of Arc on a prophetic divine saintly mission that has a
rational basis. Instead, they argue that the defendant both believed him-
self compelled to act by divine instruction and that the defendant’s per-
ception of that divine instruction was mistaken and insane.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II examines the origins of
deific decree doctrine, which was christened into U.S. law by the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court in 1844. The same case that introduced the
18. See Deborah Denno, Who is Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity, 10 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 13 (2003); Lisa Callahan et al., Insanity Defense Reform in the United
States—Post-Hinckley, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 54, 55 (1987).
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deific decree doctrine to the United States also spawned the “right-
wrong” test that deemed defendants insane if at the time of doing the act
they did not know the difference between right and wrong.19 Deific
decree, therefore, operated from the outset in relation to the right-wrong
test—its better-known fraternal twin.20 The right-wrong test represented
an exception to the general criminal law presumption that people exer-
cise free will and so can be held responsible for their illegal behavior.
Depending upon the court, the test has been understood to require that a
defendant be unable to comprehend either the illegality of his actions or
the social opprobrium that others will attach to them. Deific decree also
covered a potential third case: the defendant who felt compelled by
divinity to act despite knowing that doing so would bring legal sanction
and societal condemnation.21
Explicitly framed in Judeo-Christian terms—the doctrine requires
an order from God, not a supernatural entity in general—deific decree
reflected the prevailing sentiment among leading Americans that divine
law reigned supreme above human law.22 For psychiatrists still seeking
to establish themselves within their field, the expansion of the insanity
defense presented opportunities; defendants who might become patients
of their asylums, forums in which to appear as high-profile experts, and
audiences for their theories linking mental illness and sin. Such testi-
mony, in turn, reassured jurists that criminality would beget punishment.
Divine lawbreakers, psychiatric testimony reassured, were punished by
God with the affliction of madness, would face confinement in institu-
tions, and often suffered internally for having committed violent acts.
Judges’ almost pathological rehearsals of the story of Abraham and
Isaac—and their grim imaginings of the consequences of a sacrifice not
aborted by God—further emphasized jurists’ concern that bad acts not
go unpunished.
Part III traces three transformations in the law and science of
19. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502–03 (1844) (“In these cases, the
rule of law, as we understand it, is this: A man is not to be excused from responsibility, if he has
the capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong, as to the
particular act he is then doing; a knowledge and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong
and criminal, and will subject him to punishment. In order to be responsible, he must have
sufficient power of memory to recollect the relation in which he stands to others, and in which
others stand to him; that the act he is doing is contrary to the plain dictates of justice and right,
injurious to others, and a violation of the dictates of duty.”).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 503 (describing two situations in which an insane delusion might excuse a
criminal act, including “where he [the defendant] fully believes that the act he is doing is done by
the immediate command of God, and he acts under the delusive but sincere belief that what he is
doing is by the command of a superior power”).
22. See id. (describing the command of God as that which “supersedes all human laws, and
the laws of nature”).
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religion and madness. Beginning in 1961, the U.S. Supreme Court aban-
doned its longstanding identification of religion with Judeo-Christian
principles in favor of a focus on individual moral choices.23 Supernatural
beings, communities of faith, and non-secular beliefs, it argued, were not
necessary parts of religion.24 During a similar period, psychiatry
embraced a biomedical model of mental illness that sought clear separa-
tion between normal and abnormal mental behaviors.25 Mental processes
associated with both religion and mental illness proved a stumbling
block for the new approach, which the field has come to acknowledge
but made little progress toward resolving.
Part IV discuses the expansion of the definition of insanity, first to
include actions that were the result of irresistible impulses and then to
embrace acts merely caused by mental disease or defects. During the
period of expansion, defense lawyers mothballed deific decree defenses
in favor of newer alternatives. But the expansion of the definition of
insanity and the dormancy of deific decree rapidly unwound in response
to public outrage over the Hinckley verdict.26
Part V analyzes the post-1983 reemergence of the deific decree.
Where Christian psychiatrists and judges once found in the doctrine a
means of vindicating Christianity, culpability, and the professionaliza-
tion and institutionalization of psychiatry, deific decrees today seem
increasingly anachronistic. Psychiatry long ago established its primacy
in mental health matters, abandoned claims to authority based on Chris-
tian credentials, and ceased portraying mental illness as divine punish-
ment for sin. The field stands to gain little from its practitioners’
testimony in deific decree cases. Given the difficulties modern psychia-
try has distinguishing mental illness from religious belief, such cases
may even undermine the field. The doctrine also offers few guarantees
that culpable acts will be punished. As the Hinckley backlash demon-
strated, the public does not perceive civil commitment to be a substitute
for punishment, a view reflected in doctrine in the increasingly formal
civil and criminal distinction.27 Few jurists today believe that madness is
retribution for sin. Where the deific decree doctrine once affirmed the
official and scientific belief that Christian law was supreme over secular
law, its emphasis on the commands of a Judeo-Christian God today runs
23. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970) (stating that “sincere and
meaningful beliefs . . . need not be confined in either source or content to traditional or parochial
concepts of religion”).
24. See Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) at 495–96 & n.11.
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. See Denno, supra note 18, at 13; Callahan et al., supra note 18, at 55. R
27. See infra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. R
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counter to understandings in both law and psychiatry of the nature of
religion.
Worse yet, its scope appears to be vanishingly small. Where it once
reflected a scientific and official acceptance of an autonomous realm for
Christianity distinct from culpability and mental illness, that belief is
now absent from both discourses. Cases reveal disappearance of deific
decrees in practice, as courts attribute defendants’ claims to hear divine
instructions as symptomatic of either ongoing mental illness or provoca-
tion.28 To the extent that it continues to have force, it does so by shining
a harsh light on the modern insanity standard. Most defendants who
assert a deific decree defense are either abusive men who kill their girl-
friends and wives and then claim to be acting on orders from God or
women suffering severe postpartum depression that causes delusions of
divine instructions to kill their children.29 At the expense of throwing a
lifeline to abusers, deific decree offers a small number of women who
kill as a result of postpartum depression a defense while denying
reprieves to the greater share whose mental illness manifest in ways
other than delusions of orders from God.30 This article concludes that
deific decree doctrine has outlived its usefulness. A somewhat more
generous insanity defense would reduce the inequities and irrationalities
that deific decrees involve without appreciably loosening standards for
criminal culpability.
II. EARLY CASES: 1843–1915
There is a well-established history of exonerating or imposing a
milder punishment for people who are considered “insane.”31 Pro-
nouncements about the problem of punishing mentally impaired crimi-
nal defendants are longstanding.32 Plato wrote that insane murderers
should endure one year of exile instead of the death penalty that other
murderers should face.33 During the Middle Ages, the insane were “rou-
tinely exonerated,” a practice that continued in English common law.34
Sir Edward Coke wrote that “the act and wrong of a mad man shall not
be imputed to him . . . .”35 Blackstone agreed: “idiots and lunatics are
28. See infra Part V.A.
29. See infra Part V.C.
30. Id.
31. See Susan D. Rozelle, Fear and Loathing in Insanity Law: Explaining the Otherwise
Inexplicable Clark v. Arizona, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 23 (2007) (citing PLATO, THE LAWS
OF PLATO 258, §§ 864d–e (Thomas L. Pangle trans., 1980)).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS & IDLE HUMOURS: THE INSANITY DEFENSE FROM
ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 71 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996).
35. Brief of the Treatment Advocacy Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
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not chargeable for their own acts. . . .”36
The key question was determining who was insane. Deific com-
mand was entangled with this issue for centuries in Anglo-American
law. Judge Tracy formally recognized what became known as the “wild
beast” test for insanity in Rex v. Arnold in 1724:
[T]he jury . . . should acquit by reason of insanity if it found the
defendant to be a madman which he described as “a man that is
totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know
what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast,
such a one is never the object of punishment.”37
The “wild beast” test set the standard for English criminal law
throughout the eighteenth century.38 The English case Rex v. Arnold also
noted the possibility of a “visitation by God” in the jury instructions:
If he was under the visitation of God, and could not distinguish
between good and evil, and did not know what he did, though he
committed the greatest offence, yet he could not be guilty of any
offence against any law whatsoever; for guilt arises from the mind,
and the wicked will and intention of the man.39
In this context, “under the visitation of God” was used as a term for
delusional behavior.
In 1800, James Hadfield, believing that he was acting on God’s
orders, attempted to assassinate King George III.40 Hadfield received a
jury acquittal based on the fact that he was “under the influence of
insanity at the time the act was committed.”41 Thus, Hadfield
represented a departure from the wild beast test in two ways. First, “it
rejected the argument that the defendant must be totally deprived of
all mental faculty before acquitt[al].” Second, it was the first time
that a verdict of not guilty by reasons of insanity (NGBI) “became a
separate verdict of acquittal.”42
6 n.5, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006) (No. 05-5966) (citing EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND; OR A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON, NOT
THE NAME OF A LAWYER ONELY, BUT OF THE LAW IT SELFE 247b (2d ed. 1629)).
36. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 345–46, § 24
(1893).
37. Henry Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and
Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 14 (2007) (citation
omitted).
38. See id.
39. Rex v. Arnold (1724) (Ct. Com. Pl.) (Eng.), reprinted in 16 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 695, 764 (1816).
40. See Richard Moran, The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason of
James Hadfield (1800), 19 L. & SOC’Y REV. 487, 492 (1985).
41. See id. at 508.
42. Fradella, supra note 37, at 15. R
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English criminal law went back to the stricter wild beast standard a few
years after Hadfield, until M’Naghten was decided in 1843.43
The deific decree defense appears for the first time in American
jurisprudence in 1844.44 Commonwealth v. Rogers is a notable case in
American law not only for the first appearance of deific decree, but also
for importing the M’Naghten “right-wrong” test—the current prevailing
test of insanity—from England.45 M’Naghten, a case decided a year
before Rogers, held that the test for insanity was “whether the accused at
the time of doing the act knew the difference between right and
wrong.”46 The doctrine reflects a fundamental principle of criminal law:
because people have the ability and free will to choose socially accept-
able behavior, the state can hold people responsible and punish those
who engage in socially unacceptable behavior that violates the law.47
For people who are unable to make this choice, the state does not clas-
sify them as blameworthy or punishable.48 Thus, the insanity defense
“separates the ‘bad’ . . . from the ‘mad’ . . . .”49 M’Naghten uses a
cognitive standard as a dividing line between madness and badness.50
That is, the individual must suffer from a “disease of the mind” that
overwhelms her ability to know socially acceptable behavior or emo-
tional impetuosity.51 M’Naghten also requires total impairment, as
reflected in the Rogers requirement of a “[full] belief”; people who are
43. See id. at 15 (“[W]ithin a few years of the Hadfield decision, English jurisprudence
reverted to using Justice Tracy’s wild beast test, which did require a near complete deprivation of
mental faculties for an acquittal.”).
44. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 503 (1844). The theme had
appeared in American literature prior to its discussion in the law. For example, in Wieland, or the
Transformation, An American Tale, by B. C. Brown, Wieland, the central character, is ordered by
God to kill his wife and child. See Christopher Hawthorne, “Deific Decree”: The Short, Happy
Life of a Pseudo-Doctrine, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1755, 1809 n.341 (2000) (citing B. C. BROWN,
WIELAND, OR THE TRANSFORMATION, AN AMERICAN TALE (1811)).
45. See Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) at 503; Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(H.L.) 722.
46. See M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. at 722. Daniel M’Naghten was charged with
murder for attempting to kill the Tory prime minister and killing his secretary instead. See
RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL
MCNAUGHTAN 5 (1981). M’Naghten insisted, unsuccessfully, that the Tories were persecuting
him. See id. Though the courts and most commentators have treated Daniel M’Naghten’s
assertions of persecution as mental illness, Richard Moran has made a compelling argument that
M’Naghten was in fact correct that the Tories were persecuting him and that the trial should be
seen in a political, and not an exclusively psychiatric, light. See id.
47. See Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, “God Told Me to Kill”: Religion or Delusion?, 38
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 973, 997 (2001).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 998.
50. See M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. at 719.
51. See id.
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only partially affected by insanity cannot succeed under M’Naghten.52
Rogers did not include an explicit claim of deific decree, although
the defendant did plead not guilty by reason of insanity.53 The mention
of deific decree came in Judge Shaw’s majority opinion offering an
example of a delusion that might be successful in receiving a not guilty
verdict due to insanity:
[W]here he fully believes that the act he is doing is done by the
immediate command of God, and he acts under the delusive but sin-
cere belief that what he is doing is by the command of a superior
power, which supersedes all human laws, and the laws of nature.54
Judge Shaw’s deific decree instruction reflects the prevailing senti-
ments of the period.55 Divine law is above human law and the court
cannot question or prevent it.56 The focus is on the delusion, what form
it takes, and the speaker. The command must be immediate and direct;
the defendant cannot conclude based on rational deduction that killing is
the only recourse.57 The speaker must be God, instead of another good
or bad supernatural entity.58 Even though deific decree only allows com-
mands by God, Judge Shaw does not provide an explicit reason why
God receives such exclusive treatment under the law.59 Other scholars
have argued that because God takes up all of the space within a morality
framework, humans are powerless against God because there is no way
to argue against Him.60
Judge Shaw’s standard suggests that mental health doctors are not
the only ones able to identify those who are insane due to deific decree.
Mental health doctors could indicate whether the person is delusional,
but the court presumes that normal people would be suspicious of such a
command.61 Compounding this dilemma, Judge Shaw presumes that
although the deific decree assumes the coloration of a religious com-
mand, it is clear that it is not one, evidencing Judge Shaw’s belief that
52. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 503 (1844).
53. See id. at 501.
54. See Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) at 503.
55. Religion and mental illness were closely linked, so it would be in keeping with that link
that religion would present fertile ground for a hypothetical case involving mental illness. See
Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense
Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 625–26 (1989–90); Morris & Haroun, supra note
47, at 1002. R




60. See Morris & Haroun, supra note 47, at 1004–05; Andrew J. Demko, Note, Abraham’s R
Deific Defense: Problems with Insanity, Faith, and Knowing Right from Wrong, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1961, 1961–62, 1977 (2005); Hawthorne, supra note 44, at 1758–59. R
61. See Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) at 503.
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God would not ask a person to commit such an act, even though this was
exactly the case in the story of Abraham and Isaac.62
In nineteenth-century America, religion—or more specifically,
Christianity—and mental disorder, shared a strong connection.63 A diag-
nosis of insanity implied more than a “pure” medical diagnosis.64
Mental disorder was a “condition inflicted by God . . . as a deific punish-
ment for some mortal sin.”65 Thus, while insanity separated badness
from madness, at the time that Rogers was decided, the professionaliza-
tion of mental health was in its infancy. Many of these new profession-
als were advocates who drew on their religious faith to argue for the
benevolent treatment of the mentally ill.66 The initial leader in asylum
building was the Reverend Louis Dwight, an agent for the American
Bible Society.67 Dwight toured prisons and was appalled at the manage-
ment of the mentally ill.68 In 1833, he created a lunatic hospital in
Worcester, Massachusetts that quickly became a model for other asy-
lums built throughout the United States in the 1830s and 1840s.69 In
addition, Dorothea Dix, a devout Unitarian who taught a religious class
in a jail in Massachusetts, led the charge for caring for the mentally ill in
public asylums.70 In 1844, the year the Rogers case was decided, the
Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the
Insane, the precursor to the American Psychiatric Association, was
created.71
In contrast to the mental health doctors of the first wave of asylum
building in the late 1700s and early 1800s, which stalled due to a lack of
funding and of paying patients, mental health doctors of the mid-1800s
relied on prevailing public sentiment to establish themselves as profes-
sionals and lobby for state funding for their work.72 Though the justifi-
cation for their expertise was the cure—or at least the identification and
management—of the mentally ill, the foundation for their claims was
fragile.73 As Gerald Grob argues: “In articulating their views, psychia-
trists employed language derived from science and medicine as well as
62. See Morris & Haroun, supra note 47, at 1003–04; Genesis 22:2. R
63. See Morris & Haroun, supra note 47, at 1002. R
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF AMERICA’S
MENTALLY ILL 56–57 (1994).
67. See id. at 43.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 44–45.
70. See id. at 50.
71. See id. at 45.
72. See id. at 50–51.
73. See id. at 58.
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religion. The absence of persuasive empirical data was largely over-
looked; the psychiatric claim to legitimacy and authority derived from
the character of practitioners and their institutional position as superin-
tendents.”74 In the mid-1800s, this meant emphasizing their moral as
well as their medical bona fides. Thus, Thomas Kirkbride, the biggest
influence in asylum development during the mid-1800s, was described
as a “Christian and Physician.”75
Since there was little empirical evidence for mental illness, mental
health doctors diagnosed patients based on observation,76 classified
mental illness into three broad diagnoses,77 and grouped the causes of
insanity into two rough categories, physical/moral or emotional.78 For
example, insanity occurred when a physical accident or the patient’s vio-
lation of divine law (such as through alcoholism) caused “lesions on the
brain, the organ of the mind.”79 Mental health doctors often referred to
the mind as synonymous with the soul, so ultimately mental illness was
the physical expression of the illness of the soul.80 As mental health
professionals felt that they had more influence over the moral causes of
insanity than the physical, they emphasized (Protestant) morality in their
arguments to the public and in their treatments.81
In the 1860s and 1870s, English and American mental health doc-
tors criticized M’Naghten because it only looked at mental illness
originating in the “intellectual faculties” instead of the emotional.82
Despite their criticisms of the insanity doctrine, mental health doctors
eagerly embraced the prospect of testifying in court as a way to bolster
their authority, since insanity hearings provided a public demonstration
74. Id.
75. See id. at 57 (emphasis added). Kirkbride was a devoutly orthodox Quaker. See id.
76. See id. at 58.
77. CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE TRIAL OF THE ASSASSIN GUITEAU: PSYCHIATRY AND LAW
IN THE GILDED AGE 53–54 (1968). People were diagnosed with “congenital or traumatic mental
deficiency, raving mania or stupor, and . . . irrational belief or illogical action.” Id.
78. See GROB, supra note 66, at 58, 60 (“The holistic concept of mental illnesses which saw
physical disorder of the brain as the cause of the insanity required of most American psychiatrists
an act of faith. Except for a few cases in which autopsies revealed the presence of a brain tumor or
other gross abnormality, the link between the brain and madness remained a mystery.”).
79. Id. at 58.
80. Id. “The major causal factors in mid-nineteenth-century psychiatric thought included
intemperance, masturbation, overwork, domestic difficulties, excessive ambitions, faulty
education, personal disappointments, marital problems, excessive religious enthusiasm, jealousy,
and pride.” Id. at 60; see also ROSENBERG, supra note 77, at 74–75. See generally JOHN H. R
WARNER, THE THERAPEUTIC PERSPECTIVE: MEDICAL PRACTICE, KNOWLEDGE, AND IDENTITY IN
AMERICA 1820–1885 (1986).
81. See GROB, supra note 66, at 58–63. For example, Edward Jarvis, a prominent psychiatrist,
told the Massachusetts Medical Society that the length of people’s lives depended “upon our
obedience to those laws which God has stamped upon our frames.” See id. at 63.
82. See ROSENBERG, supra note 77, at 55, 68. R
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of their abilities. Specialists in mental health did not receive special sta-
tus in court, however, as testimony on the defendant’s mental status was
not considered solely the province of mental health doctors.83 Witnesses
ideally provided the right mixture of status and intimacy for factfinders
to believe their testimony about the defendant’s life. Thus, anyone,
including ministers, neighbors, and friends, was permitted to offer evi-
dence on the defendant’s mental state.84
In this time period, mental health doctors attempted to increase
their status in the court system by convincing the court that they were
the best authorities (unlike ministers) on the “true” nature of the defen-
dant.85 Mental health doctors did have an advantage over other witnesses
in that they could offer a place for an insane defendant to stay, separated
from the rest of society, once the trial ended; mental health doctors
presented courts the possibility of finding defendants insane without
worrying about releasing them upon the public. In addition, mental
health doctors’ emphasis on the moral aspects of insanity reassured
courts that defendants were not escaping scot-free by pleading
insanity.86
The next major case to invoke deific decree, the trial of Charles
Guiteau for the assassination of President Garfield in 1882, received
substantial attention, although mostly due to the victim.87 Guiteau’s case
generated a trial record 3,000 pages in length and illustrated new legal
shifts in the framing of mental health, religion, and criminal responsibil-
ity. Mental health doctors saw Guiteau’s trial as a great opportunity to
showcase their developing expertise and authority in a trial that captured
public attention. The court system was also under pressure to perform its
expertise on criminal punishment to a wider public audience. Given that
the President had died after prolonged suffering within public view, this
pressure included finding the defendant sane so that he could be pun-
ished at the end of the trial. As a result, the judge for this case not only
had to steer the jury through the competing testimony of multiple
“experts” on Guiteau, he also had to shape the jury’s—and the pub-
lic’s—perception of insanity, religion, and criminal responsibility.88
During this time, neurologists and psychiatrists still felt that
insanity was the end of a continuum that determined normal psychologi-
83. See id. at 67.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 68 (“In legal contexts the term ‘moral insanity’ implied an inability to conform
to the moral dictates of society—as consequence of disease, not depravity . . . .”).
87. Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. 161, 162 (D.C. 1882).
88. See id. at 179–82.
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cal health.89 Above all, they agreed that insanity was a physical disease,
that emotional problems could cause or exacerbate mental illness, and
that insanity was curable.90 During the 1880s, the definition of mental
illness was also expanded to include not only “psychoses,” but also
“neuroses” and “character disorders.”91
Despite their unanimity on the physical nature of mental illness,
mental health doctors were sharply divided on the relationship between
mental illness and criminal responsibility.92 Conservatives supported a
narrow interpretation of M’Naghten that rejected the idea of emotional
and behavioral differentiation for mental illness and did not believe that
insanity occurred throughout the defendant’s life.93 Liberal doctors
rejected behavioral determinism and a narrow reading of M’Naghten,
instead finding emotions to be significant.94
Disagreements also occurred along continental lines. Europeans
followed Cesare Lombroso’s emerging model of criminal anthropology,
which emphasized biological and mechanistic rationales for mental ill-
ness and criminality.95 In their view, people were born insane or with
criminal propensities.96 In contrast, American psychiatrists rejected a
strictly deterministic approach and emphasized the continuing impor-
tance of morality—and particularly sin—as a fundamental aspect of
individual responsibility and social control and stability.97 As John P.
Gray, the influential head of the Utica Asylum in New York, argued in
1878: “A defendant . . . may be cunning, shrewd, active; he may deceive
the best of men constantly; he may have no delusion whatever, no dis-
ease, only this propensity, this thieving; and out of this shall we origi-
nate the word kleptomania, and call him a lunatic?”98
Consequently, for American mental health doctors, morality
encompassed both physical qualities (mental functioning) and spiritual
ones (sin).99 Neurologists thought that patterns of behavior wore grooves
along nerve paths, so that habit redirected impulse and sin reshaped indi-
89. See ROSENBERG, supra note 77, at 64. R
90. Id. (“Insanity, American physicians agreed, was a disease of the brain. And disease, no
medical man doubted, was of necessity a physical phenomenon; insanity was essentially a
material ailment, no different in essence than mumps or typhoid fever.”).
91. Id. at 68.
92. Id. at 63.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 63–64.
95. See id. at 69.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 63, 70. In addition, Gray believed his European counterparts expressed “excessive
and morbid sentimentalism toward criminals” due to “a lack of religious training” and a focus on
“European materialism and sensualism.” Id. at 73.
99. See id. at 73.
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vidual volition.100 As a result, even though criminal defendants were
unable to control themselves when the crime occurred, this did not indi-
cate that they were not criminally responsible, because defendants were
responsible for the series of immoral actions that led to the criminal
act.101 Therefore, a key objective of mental health doctors at this time
was to separate immoral criminals from sinful lunatics.
As mental health doctors framed insanity as a physical and moral
disease, they emphasized the defendant’s record of criminality. If he had
a long criminal record, then the instant crime would be in keeping with
his previous behavior: “His crime was simply the result of evil impulse,
not mental illness.”102 On the other hand, if the crime was an aberrant
event in the defendant’s life, mental health doctors were more inclined
to attribute his or her behavior to mental illness.103 Both popularly and
medically, insane acts of violence were unpremeditated.
Thus, Guiteau was a poor fit for pleading insanity, since the defen-
dant had organized and planned the crime.104 Moreover, his history of
instability and immorality indicated a bad character, which made him
responsible.105 Despite these disadvantages, Guiteau claimed deific
decree as his justification for the killing.106 This argument was ulti-
mately unsuccessful, although the case included a deific decree instruc-
tion to the jury where Judge Cox cited Roger’s rendition of deific
decree.107 In addition, Judge Cox added the following scenario:
[A] man, whom you know to be an affectionate father, insists that the
Almighty has appeared to him and commanded him to sacrifice his
child. No reasoning has convinced him of his duty to do it, but the
command is as real to him as my voice is now to you. No reasoning
or remonstrance can shake his conviction or deter him from his pur-
pose. This is an insane delusion, the coinage of a diseased brain, as
seems to be generally supposed, which defies reason and ridicule,
100. See id. at 59.
101. See id. Rosenberg cites a Methodist clergyman that stated: “men are to be held
responsible not only for their immediate choices, conscious volitions, willful acts, deliberate
intentions, but withal for all choices, volitions, willful acts, intentions—conscious or otherwise,
intentional or unintentional—which may be traced to, or regarded as, the natural and legitimate
outcome of self-induced character . . . . Why, indeed, should not a moral agent be held to a strict
account for all the remote as well as the immediate results of his free, intelligent choices.” Id.
102. Id. at 64–65.
103. Id. at 65.
104. See Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. 161, 179, 181–82 (D.C. 1882).
105. ROSENBERG, supra note 77, at 194. R
106. See id. at 86 (describing Guiteau’s defense strategy, whereby “[f]irst, he would appeal to
the public, explaining his inspiration, detailing his pious life, and outlining the legal arguments
that justified his acquittal,” and second, either as alternative or supplementary line of defense, “he
would establish his insanity and irresponsibility by proving that the Lord had stripped him of free
will”).
107. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. R
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which palsies the reason, blindfolds the conscience, and throws into
disorder all the springs of human action.108
In his decision, Judge Cox provides an extensive exegesis on the
difference between beliefs and delusions, both sane and insane. Social
and political beliefs—including religious beliefs—arise from and
respond to reasoning and reflection, but delusions do not.109 Judge Cox
qualifies this assertion by arguing that certain religious beliefs, such as
“animal magnetism” and “spiritualism,” are absurd and result from poor
reasoning, ignorance, fraud, or “perverted moral sentiments.”110 None-
theless, he separates even absurd religious beliefs from delusions,
including deific decrees, which do not stem from reason: If a man “acts
under the delusive but sincere belief that what he is doing is by the
command of a superior power,” this belief would be an “imaginary
inspiration amounting to an insane delusion.”111 Judge Cox notes that
some religious believers, such as certain Christians, would disagree with
his assessment. “[M]any Christians believe . . . that they . . . receive
special providential guidance and illumination in reference to both their
inward thoughts and outward actions, and, in an undefined sense, are
inspired to pursue a certain course of action; but this is a mere sane
belief, whether well or ill founded.”112 Thus, even though a Christian
would believe that reason did not produce his or her religious belief,
Judge Cox would argue that the reasoning process had in fact occurred.
In effect, Judge Cox positions himself as an expert who is able to under-
stand religion better than those who are religious believers.
Judge Cox, though, does not explain why deific decrees are delu-
sions while religious beliefs in themselves are not. He does propose that
if there was a sudden change in a defendant’s belief system, then the
change is probably due to mental disorder, not religious revelation.113
However, since he characterizes religious beliefs as amenable to altera-
tion and as possibly absurd, it is difficult to discern the difference
between an unanticipated absurd religious revelation and an abrupt
insane delusion. Strikingly, Judge Cox confidently believes that his
example is an insane delusion, even though his example is a literal
retelling of the story of Abraham and Isaac.114 Moreover, his example
108. Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. at 172. For discussion of a similar hypothetical, see supra note 62 R
and accompanying text.
109. Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. at 171.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 177, 192.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 171; see also id. at 172 (“Inasmuch as these disorders are of gradual growth and
indefinite continuance, if he is shown insane shortly before or after the commission of the crime, it
is natural to conjecture, at least, that he was so at the time.”).
114. See supra note 62. R
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clearly does not fit the scenario of Guiteau’s crime. Judge Cox’s exam-
ple signals the difficulty of a father who despite his deep affection for
his child must obey a supernatural authority. His example illustrates the
dilemma of choosing between the two most personal relationships of the
man’s life: betraying the child that he is supposed to protect and obeying
the supernatural deity in whose name morality exists. While the court
“understands” the position of the person caught in such a dilemma, reli-
gion is bracketed by societal obligation: this type of person is not held
criminally responsible, but neither is he set free or his behavior con-
doned as normal. In contrast, Guiteau had no such personal relationship
with President Garfield. His crime must be understood within the realm
of the political (and the delusional), not within the boundaries of per-
sonal affection, either to a human or to a God.
In the last early case defining deific decree, People v. Schmidt, in
1915, the defendant argued that he was commanded by God to kill a
woman.115 Hans Schmidt had impersonated a Catholic priest and was
accused of killing Anna Aumuller, a servant in his church who was
pregnant with Schmidt’s child.116 Schmidt argued that God told him to
kill and dismember Aumuller as a sacrifice.117 The jury in the trial con-
victed him of murder.118 After the conviction, Schmidt confessed to
inventing the story about God commanding him to kill and asked for a
new trial on the charge of manslaughter, instead of murder.119 In addi-
tion, Schmidt argued that there was an error in the trial because the trial
judge defined “wrong” in the “right-wrong” test to mean “contrary to the
law of the state.”120 Future Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
one of the most renowned judges of Anglo-American law, rendered the
verdict for the Appellate Court of New York.121 Unlike Guiteau, a trial
case in which Judge Cox had to give instructions to the factfinders and
navigate the evidentiary proceedings in the face of a huge audience,
Schmidt was an appellate case in which a panel of judges rendered a
decision on questions of law, not fact. Moreover, the case was already
decided by the time that Judge Cardozo actually wrote his musings on
the right-wrong test and deific decree. Thus, Judge Cardozo’s reasoning
was probably forward-looking, intended to provide guidelines as to how
future judges should define “wrongness,” rather than merely to explicate
the decision at hand.
115. People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 945 (N.Y. 1915).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 950.
119. Id. at 945.
120. Id. at 946.
121. See id. at 945.
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In his decision, Judge Cardozo distinguishes between a religious
cult that practices polygamy or human sacrifice and a real religion—
Christianity.122 These cult believers would not receive the protection of
an insanity defense; they would be considered criminally responsible
because, “however false according to our own standards, [their beliefs
are] not the product of disease.”123 Thus, in Schmidt, Judge Cardozo
illustrates what the court should do when personal belief and social
beliefs conflict.
Judge Cardozo declined to grant a new trial, but he agreed that the
trial court erred in defining the word “wrong” from the M’Naghten
right-wrong test to mean “contrary to the law of the state.”124 Instead,
Judge Cardozo argued that “wrong” should encompass “moral wrong”
as well as “legal wrong.”125 He agreed with the definitions of deific
decree provided in Rogers and Guiteau,126 and in his version of the doc-
trine, he presents the problem of a defendant who thinks that what she
does is morally right, although it is legally wrong:
A mother kills her infant child to whom she has been devotedly
attached. She knows the nature and quality of the act; she knows that
the law condemns it; but she is inspired by an insane delusion that
God has appeared to her and ordained the sacrifice. It seems a mock-
ery to say that, within the meaning of the statute, she knows that the
act is wrong.127
Judge Cardozo argued that a crime inspired by deific decree was
the strongest case for finding defendants not guilty by reason of insanity:
“We find nothing either in the history of the rule, or in its reason and
purpose, or in judicial exposition of its meaning, to justify [finding this
hypothetical mother criminally liable]. No jury would be likely to find a
defendant responsible in such a case, whatever a judge might tell
them.”128 Deific decree was used as a justification for an interpretation
of M’Naghten and as the best example of the court’s ability to force
defendants to alter their behavior according to legal conceptions of right
and wrong.
122. See id. at 950.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 946.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 948 (quoting Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. 161, 182 (D.C. 1882)) (“‘If a man insanely
believes that he has a command from the Almighty to kill, it is difficult to understand how such a
man can know that it is wrong for him to do it.’ Such a man is no less insane because he knows
that murder is prohibited by human law. Indeed, it may emphasize his insanity that, knowing the
human law, he believes that he is acting under the direct command of God.”).
127. Id. at 949.
128. Id.
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III. THE LATENT PERIOD OF DEIFIC DECREE: 1915–1983
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Religion
As scholars Grant Morris and Ansar Haroun note, Supreme Court
religious jurisprudence is the direct opposite of its jurisprudence on por-
nography: while the Court “knows pornography when [it] sees it,” only
individuals “know” religion, while the Court does not.129 This section
briefly reviews the Supreme Court’s treatment of religion under the First
Amendment. The cases in this section underscore that the Court’s treat-
ment of religion is tentative at best, that religion is defined by an indi-
vidual’s “sincere belief,” and that the definition of religion has
broadened over time. Though this section demonstrates the Court’s
increased willingness to expand its definition of religion beyond Judeo-
Christian boundaries, its refusal to mine the details of what encompasses
a religion and its insistence on separating religious beliefs from other
types of beliefs hinders efforts to construct a coherent thesis out of
Supreme Court religious jurisprudence.
In the 1890 case of Davis v. Beason, the Court constructed a narrow
definition of religion as a belief in a deity.130 “The term ‘religion’ has
reference to one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obliga-
tions they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedi-
ence to his will.”131 This definition encompassed the conventional
Judeo-Christian belief in and worship of God and little else. In the same
year, in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, the
Court characterized polygamy as a nonreligious belief.132 Polygamy did
not receive the protection of religion because it was “contrary to the
spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity ha[d]
produced . . . .”133
The Court kept the narrow Judeo-Christian definition of religion
from Davis and Church of Latter-Day Saints for the next seventy years.
In 1961, in Torcaso v. Watkins, the appellant argued that a state constitu-
tional provision requiring an applicant for public office to declare a
belief in God unconstitutionally infringed upon his freedom of belief.134
The Court agreed, holding that the Constitution prohibited the govern-
ment from enacting laws that favor all religions to the disadvantage of
129. See Morris & Haroun, supra note 47, at 986 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 R
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
130. See 133 U.S. 333, 341–43 (1890), overruled by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
131. Id. at 342. In addition, religions—and not cults—were granted constitutional protection.
See id.
132. See 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890).
133. Id.
134. See 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961).
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“non-believers” or laws that favor religions based on a belief in God
over religions based on different beliefs.135 In his majority opinion, Jus-
tice Black cited Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular
Humanism as examples of nontheistic religions.136
When the Supreme Court encountered challenges to the Military
Selective Service Act, it radically expanded the definition of religious
belief. The Military Selective Service Act exempts from the draft people
with religious training and beliefs who are conscientiously opposed to
participation in war.137 In the Act, “religious training and belief” was
defined as the “individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,” but
did not and still “does not include essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”138 In 1965,
United States v. Seeger interpreted the Military Selective Service Act’s
“Supreme Being” requirement to include people who have a “sincere
and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption . . . .”139 The Court concluded that though Seeger was doubt-
ful that God existed, he genuinely believed in “goodness and virtue for
their own sakes,” and thus he qualified for conscientious objector sta-
tus.140 The Court based its expansive decision on Congress’ use of the
phrase “Supreme Being” instead of “God” in section 6(j) of the Univer-
sal Military Training and Service Act.141 In 1970, Welsh v. United States
took Seeger even further by granting conscientious objector status to
Welsh, who explicitly denied a religious basis to his objections to all
war.142 Instead, the Court held that Welsh’s formation of his beliefs
through “reading the fields of history and sociology” was sufficient.143
135. See id. at 495–96.
136. See id. at 495 n.11.
137. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 451–73 (2012). The statute was initially the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, Pub. L. No. 51, § 1, 451(a), 65 Stat. 75, 75 (1951). It was then changed to the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1, 451(a), 81 Stat. 100, 100 (1967).
138. See Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 759, § 7, 62 Stat. 604, 613 (1948)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1958)).
139. 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). The Act was amended after the Seeger decision to delete the
reference to a “Supreme Being.” See Morris & Haroun, supra note 47, at 983 n.50 (citing Military R
Selective Service Act of 1967 § 7, 456(j)). As Morris and Haroun note, however, the Act keeps
the distinction between religious beliefs and “political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a
merely personal moral code.” See id.
140. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
141. Id. at 175.
142. See 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970).
143. Id. Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Welsh argued that the Court should engage the
Establishment Clause directly and strike down the statute because it exempted those with religious
objections to war but not those with secular objections. See id. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan’s argument, however, was not shared by a majority of the Court and did not
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Since Welsh, the Supreme Court has not directly considered the defini-
tion of religion, although they have attempted to maintain a distinction
between the secular and the religious.
Though the umbrella of religion expanded from Davis to Welsh, the
Supreme Court consistently considered religious beliefs to be personal.
For example, in their 1890 cases, the Court focused on the individual’s
view of their relationship with his or her Creator. Moreover, the Court
has argued that although they try to distinguish the religious from the
secular, it is absurd to separate the religious from the personal. Further-
more, the Court has held that religious belief is not limited to those in a
monotheistic religion, those who think that all Gods are good, or those
who believe in illogical beliefs.
For example, in 1944, the Court in United States v. Ballard admit-
ted that a person’s religious views might seem “incredible, if not prepos-
terous, to most people.”144 The majority flatly declared, “Heresy trials
are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot
prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or
beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be
incomprehensible to others.”145
More recently, in 1981, the Court in Thomas v. Review Board of the
Indiana Employment Security Division did not analyze whether Thomas’
refusal to work under provisions that violated his beliefs as a Jehovah’s
Witness was religious or nonreligious.146 The Court accepted on its face
Thomas’ statement that he could not work because of his religion.147
Chief Justice Burger argued for the majority that courts are not allowed
to determine whether a belief is religious by asking whether it is
“acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others.”148
According to the majority of the Court, even if an individual cannot
articulate his beliefs with “clarity and precision,” and even if an individ-
ual admits that he is “struggling with his position,” courts are not per-
mitted to dissect them further and say they are not religious.149
Furthermore, even if other members of the same religion interpret the
requirements of the religion differently, “the guarantee of free exercise
is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a
provide the basis for subsequent decisions. Cf., e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971).
144. See 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
145. See id. at 86.
146. See 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
147. See id.
148. Id. at 714. See also Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)
(“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”).
149. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
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religious sect.”150 This refusal to examine the boundaries of religion is
justified because courts do not have the competence nor is it their func-
tion to determine which individual correctly understands the beliefs of
their religious faith. These boundaries, however, do not encompass
claims that are “so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not
to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause [of the First
Amendment],” but the Court does not provide an example of such a
claim.151 Thus, courts are not allowed to classify beliefs as religious or
nonreligious, even though they must make a distinction between the two
because religious beliefs are constitutionally protected. Moreover, a
religious belief does not have to be shared by others or be logical on its
face even to the individual holding the belief. The Court does, however,
bracket out claims that are so “bizarre” that they are not religious, even
though there are no guidelines for distinguishing these bizarre nonreli-
gious claims from illogical religious ones.
The Supreme Court’s analysis of religion has not provided a com-
plete picture that could guide lower courts. Lower court judges must fall
back on their own sense of each case and of religion; that is, their inter-
pretation of a “sincere” belief, or a “bizarre” one, thus creating a patch-
work of cases on religion guided by their judges’ backgrounds and
cultural assumptions on what religion means. Furthermore, since the
Court started with a core definition of religion reflective of “traditional”
Judeo-Christianity and worked its way outward, the most precariously
positioned religious beliefs are those that seem the least like the beliefs
of Judeo-Christianity. This is the case even though the Court could not
articulate a coherent and consistent reason why certain beliefs would fall
on the wrong side of their dividing line. Likewise, the Court’s claim that
they do not probe into religious beliefs is disingenuous. The parties must
present their beliefs to the Court for examination, and the Court must
decide whether the beliefs are religious at all.
B. Mental Health Developments
The general confusion over the definition of religion, notwithstand-
ing the privileging of deific decree in the law, does not track the psychi-
150. See id. at 715–16.
151. Id. at 715. See also Morris & Haroun, supra note 47, at 986 (citing Brown v. Pena, 441 F. R
Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff’d, 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979)). In Brown, the plaintiff argued
that he was discriminated against because of his religious belief that “‘Kozy Kitten People/Cat
Food . . . is contributing significantly to [his] state of well being . . . [and therefore] to [his] overall
work performance’ by increasing his energy.” Brown, 441 F. Supp. at 1383–84 (alterations in
original). His claim was denied by the Equal Opportunity Commission, and the court determined
his claim was frivolous because his belief was a “mere personal preference.” See id. at 1385.
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atric understanding of delusions or psychotic commands.152 While there
is a legal understanding of insanity, psychiatrists who are called as
expert witnesses for criminal trials rely upon their own diagnostic rubric
for assessing mental states.153 The “bible” of mental health professionals
is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”),
which is the handbook of the American Psychiatric Association and was
first published in 1952.154 The first version—DSM-I—encompassed less
than seventy diagnoses and followed a psychodynamic model akin to the
model of mental health developed in the 1800s.155 Normality and abnor-
mality were on a behavioral continuum. Patients shifted their position on
the continuum through their reactions to environmental factors that
altered their behavior. DSM-III, published in 1980, changed the DSM
from a psychodynamic model to a biomedical model that had a clear
separation between normal and abnormal mental behavior.156 DSM-IV,
published in 1994 and revised in 2000, ballooned to over 300 diagnoses
collected into five axes of disorder.157 The current version of the DSM,
DSM-5, was issued in 2013.158 While it still contains the voluminous
catalog of diagnoses from its predecessor, the DSM-5 eliminated the
axes model of DSM-IV and instead substituted a life-span approach,
where diagnoses tracked people over the course of their lives.159
DSM-IV allocates more room in its glossary section to “delusion”
152. Command hallucinations are quite frequent. See Hallucinations, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, http://www.minddisorders.com/Flu-Inv/Hallucinations.html (last visited
Apr. 11, 2015) (discussing command hallucinations without differentiating between religious and
nonreligious command hallucinations).
153. Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatrist as Expert Witness, in THE PSYCHIATRIST IN THE
COURTROOM: SELECTED PAPERS OF BERNARD L. DIAMOND, M.D. 233 (Jacques M. Quen ed.,
1994).
154. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(1952) [hereinafter DSM-I]. The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related
Health Problems (“ICD”), first published by the American Public Health Association in 1898 and
published by the World Health Organization since 1948, is the international standard for mental
health diagnosis, except for the United States where the DSM predominates.
155. See DSM-I, supra note 154. See also text accompanying note 89.
156. Dena T. Smith & Jennifer Hemler, Constructing Order: Classification and Diagnosis, in
SOCIAL ISSUES IN DIAGNOSIS: AN INTRODUCTION FOR STUDENTS AND TECHNICIANS 15, 26
(Annemarie Goldstein Jutel & Kevin Dew eds., 2014).
157. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 819–28 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. A key factor for the publication of the
DSM-IV was to change the DSM’s coding for insurance purposes, so that it aligned better to the
ICD’s coding. The diagnoses, however, remained the same.
158. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. The American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) changed the
DSM from Roman numerals to Arabic numerals in order to indicate official revisions in the future.
Thus, the next revision will be named DSM 5.1.
159. See id. at xlii.
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than to any other term.160 According to the DSM-IV, a delusion is a
“false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is
firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite
what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof of evidence to the
contrary.”161 Strikingly, the glossary specifically excludes religious
beliefs from the delusion category: “The belief is not one ordinarily
accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subculture (e.g., it
is not an article of religious faith).”162 The description goes on to
describe false beliefs that use value judgments (e.g., “I am the most bril-
liant psychiatrist in the world.”).163 These statements are considered
delusions if the “judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.”164 The
definition then lists twelve types of common delusions.165 Though “per-
secutory delusions,” “grandiose delusions,” and “bizarre delusions” are
included, “religious delusions” are not.166 DSM-5 eliminates the specific
carve out for religion and instead lists an array of delusions: “Delusions
are fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting
evidence. Their content may include a variety of themes (e.g. persecu-
tory, referential, somatic, religious, grandiose). . . . Delusions are
deemed bizarre if they are clearly implausible and not understandable to
same-culture peers and do not derive from ordinary life experiences.”167
Delusions are only one part of the diagnosis of a mental disorder.
One can be delusional but not have a formal mental disorder. The most
common diagnosis for a person invoking deific decree is schizophrenia.
Under the DSM-IV, a diagnosis of schizophrenia requires that a person
have either: (1) two or more of five symptoms during a one-month
period (delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorga-
nized or catatonic behavior, or negative symptoms such as affective flat-
tening, alogia or avolition); or (2) experience “bizarre” delusions.168
Delusions are bizarre, according to the DSM-IV glossary, if they
“involve[ ] a phenomenon that the person’s culture would regard as
totally implausible” and, according to the definition under schizophre-
nia, if “they are clearly implausible and not understandable and do not
derive from ordinary life experiences.”169 DSM-5 ends the bizarre/non-
bizarre distinction and instead requires that two symptoms be present, at
160. See DSM-IV, supra note 157, at 819–28. R




165. Id. at 821–22.
166. Id.
167. DSM-5, supra note 158, at 87. R
168. DSM-IV, supra note 157, at 299. R
169. Id. at 299, 821.
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least one of which must be hallucinations, delusions, or disorganized
speech.170 The previous classification was eliminated due to “limited
diagnostic stability, low reliability, and poor validity.”171
Research indicates sharp disagreement among clinicians as to what
a bizarre delusion actually is.172 This confusion increases if the tested
delusion has a religious theme or if the people experiencing the delusion
have diverse ethnic or cultural beliefs.173 In a telling example, clinicians
in one research experiment classified vignettes that included the voice of
God commanding individuals to baptize their newborn child, prepare a
worship service, or sacrifice their child.174 The researchers concluded
that the “essential determining factor in the ratings was not the dimen-
sions of religious experience, but the degree to which religious experi-
ence deviated from conventional religious beliefs and practices. The
more unconventional the experience, the less religiously authentic and
less mentally healthy it was deemed to be.”175 The least religiously
authentic and most pathological vignette was God’s command to sacri-
fice the child—a story common to the world’s largest monotheistic
religions.176
Despite the biomedical framework of DSM-IV and DSM-5, they
both include cultural criteria without explaining how a predominant cul-
tural belief could affect or override a biological explanation for mental
illness. Thus, for a person receiving a deific command to kill, a clinician
could either follow the religious exception for delusion and not find a
mental illness or characterize the deific decree as a bizarre delusion,
despite its correlation with known religious stories, and diagnose the
person as schizophrenic. Either way, the DSM does not provide a simple
route for the clinician faced with such a problem. As the DSM presumes
170. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES FROM DSM-IV-TR TO DSM-5, at 2
(2013), available at http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/changes%20from%20dsm-iv-tr%20to%20
dsm-5.pdf. See also Carl E. Fisher et al., Toward a Jurisprudence of Psychiatric Evidence:
Examining the Challenges of Reasoning from Group Data in Psychiatry to Individual Decisions in
the Law, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685, 703 n.54, 733 (2015).
171. Id. at 3.
172. See, e.g., Michael Flaum et al., The Reliability of “Bizarre” Delusions, 32
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 59, 59, 62 (1991) (discussing the unreliability of bizarre delusions
and the significant amount of disagreement on what are examples of bizarre delusions); Dodi
Goldman et al., Bizarre Delusions and DSM-III-R Schizophrenia, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 494,
498 (1992) (noting that many investigators find it difficult to reach an agreement on what
classifies as bizarre delusions); Robert J. Spitzer et al., The Reliability of Three Definitions of
Bizarre Delusions, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 880, 881 (1993) (finding moderate to poor
understandings of bizarre delusions among raters).
173. See Goldman et al., supra note 172, at 498. R
174. See Susan Sanderson et al., Authentic Religious Experience or Insanity?, 55 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL., 607, 609–10 (1999).
175. Id. at 614.
176. Id.
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that delusions fit within a falsifiable framework,177 religion qua religion
must receive an explicit carve-out or perpetually risk falling within the
realm of insanity. At the same time, since religion is not considered a
characteristic of a delusion, the clinician must make a determination of
what is considered religious in order to fit deific decree back into a
mental illness schema. A plausible explanation as to why the DSM is so
shaky on cultural context is that psychiatrists’ attention to the problem
of culture was not internally derived. Instead, outside critiques spurred
psychiatrists to make changes to the DSM in order to reflect their “sensi-
tivity” to the impact of culture upon diagnosis.178 It is an open question
of how substantive these changes actually were; the treatment of deific
decree suggests not very.
Moreover, the DSM assumes a close fit between a person’s culture
and religion—religious beliefs are an outgrowth of a person’s culture.
Arguably, a “culture” caveat for the DSM is most needed for non-
majoritarian cultures and religions, not for majoritarian ones. For exam-
ple, it is unlikely that a mainstream Catholic belief such as transubstanti-
ation would strike most psychiatrists as a bizarre delusion. However, the
DSM only grants deference to religious—and cultural—beliefs that are
“ordinary” (e.g., the ones least likely to need explanation and
protection).
IV. INSANITY DEFENSE GENERALLY
The “moral basis for the insanity defense is,” in Stephen Morse’s
words, “that there is no just punishment without desert and no desert
without responsibility.”179 To hold “some crazy persons responsible for
their criminal behavior” would be unfair.180
Over the twentieth century, the legal system expanded its definition
of insanity through statutes and court decisions.181 Though the insanity
177. Morris and Haroun suggest that deific decrees can be reconciled through the clinician’s
proving that the belief is false. Morris & Haroun, supra note 47, at 1047. This argument belies the R
fact that all religious beliefs resist empirical proofs. In addition, Moran’s work on the M’Naghten
case illustrates the potential pitfalls in proving beliefs, especially in politically loaded situations.
See generally MORAN, supra 46. R
178. Some of the most powerful outside critiques came from gay rights activists angered over
the DSM’s classification of homosexuality as a disease. See Facts About Homosexuality and
Mental Health, PSYCHOL. U.C. DAVIS, http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/faculty_sites/rainbow/html/
facts_mental_health.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2015) (“In 1973, the weight of empirical data,
coupled with changing social norms and the development of a politically active gay community in
the United States, led the Board of Directors of the American Psychiatric Association to remove
homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).”).
179. Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 779, 783 (1985).
180. Id. at 781.
181. See generally Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, “Literature As Law”: The History of the
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defense was not successful in the majority of cases, overall, the court
system displayed a willingness to examine and retool its idea of insanity
in accordance with increased information about mental health.182 Until
the 1960s, M’Naghten still predominated as the rule for most jurisdic-
tions.183 As M’Naghten does not clearly explain the definition for
“wrongness,” courts have adopted varying interpretations. Professor
Herbert Fingarette summarized three models for “wrongness”: first,
“wrongful” may be perceived as encompassing legal norms, connoting
wrong to be “contrary to law”; second, wrong may be defined as subject
to societal condemnation or against public morality; and, finally,
“wrongful” may be interpreted as contrary to one’s own conscience.184
English law clearly defines “wrong” as “legal wrong.”185 American law
is unclear about its definition of what “wrong” means, and courts take
varying approaches.186 Both case law and statutory history indicate that
particular jurisdictions have adopted all three models of “wrongfulness”
in varying forms.187 Some courts have interpreted M’Naghten as focus-
ing on legal wrong, so that a defendant is sane if she knew the offense
was illegal.188 Other courts believe that M’Naghten is about moral
wrong.189 For those courts, a defendant who receives a deific command
to kill would be found legally insane, even if she knew that killing was
legally wrong.190 The Washington Supreme Court has limited this
“moral wrong” approach to belief in deific decrees only, or “that God
ordered the crime committed.”191
Over time, the right-wrong test received accompaniments such as
the “irresistible impulse” test, or criteria that included tests of voluntari-
ness. Under the “irresistible impulse” test,
One is not guilty by reason of insanity if, “by reason of the duress of
Insanity Plea and a Fictional Application Within the Law & Literature Canon, 72 TEMP. L. REV.
381, 389–430 (1999).
182. See generally Fradella, supra note 37 (discussing a few cases where the insanity defense R
was not successful and explaining that the defense, in general, is unsuccessful).
183. See Hawkins-Leon, supra note 181, at 418–27. R
184. HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 153–54 (1972).
185. See Sheri L. Bienstock, Mothers Who Kill Their Children and Postpartum Psychosis, 32
SW. U. L. REV. 451, 475 (2003).
186. See Bageshree Ranade, Note, Conceptual Ambiguities in the Insanity Defense: State v.
Wilson and the New “Wrongfulness” Standard, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (1998).
187. See id.
188. See id. at 1401–02.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See Jeanine Girgenti, Note, Bridging the Gap Between Law and Psychology: The Deific
Decree, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 10 para.15 (2001) (citing MELTON ET AL., supra note 17, at R
199) (“To deal with the dangers of interpreting the word ‘wrong’ as a ‘moral wrong,’ the
Washington Supreme Court further limited this approach by holding that it only applies where a
defendant feels his or her act is justified as a result of a belief in the deific decree.”).
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such mental disease, he had so far lost the power to choose between
the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as that his
free agency was at the time destroyed; and if, at the same time, the
alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the rela-
tion of cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely.”192
Unlike the M’Naghten test, which focuses on cognitive capacity, the
“irresistible impulse” test emphasizes volition and whether the defendant
can control her actions.
The Durham rule or product test, introduced by Judge Bazelon of
the D.C. Circuit in the 1954 case of Durham v. United States, does not
hold a defendant “criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or defect.”193 This test encouraged the use of
evidence from psychiatry and a fuller description of the defendant’s per-
sonality.194 But the Durham rule was criticized for its vagueness and
overreliance on psychiatric testimony,195 and it was overruled in 1972
by United States v. Brawner.196
Michigan was the first state to introduce the possibility of a “guilty
but mentally ill” verdict in lieu of not guilty by reason of insanity in
1975.197 Currently, thirteen states have adopted this alternative.198
Defendants who are found guilty but mentally ill, or insane, are commit-
ted to psychiatric institutions post-verdict or sent to a psychiatric institu-
tion until they are declared mentally fit to serve out the rest of their
sentences in prison. Critics of this alternative argue that defendants usu-
ally do not receive psychiatric treatment and are treated the same as
defendants convicted under regular guilty verdicts; “the defendant will
192. Ranade, supra note 186, at 1378 (citing ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE R
(1967); Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 866 (Ala. 1887)).
193. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (1954).
194. See id. at 875–76.
195. Girgenti, supra note 191 (stating that the Durham test was criticized for its lack of R
guidance); Ranade, supra note 186, at 1378 (arguing that all tests for “wrongfulness” are R
ambiguous).
196. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981–83 (1972) (providing a rationale for
adopting the ALI approach and overruling Durham).
197. See Linda C. Fentiman, “Guilty But Mentally Ill”: The Real Verdict is Guilty, 26 B.C. L.
REV. 601, 614 (1985).
198. “Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah” have adopted the guilty but
mentally ill verdict. Bella Feinstein, Note, Saving the Deific Decree Exception to the Insanity
Defense in Illinois, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 561, 567 n.33 (citing ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 12.47.040 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(b) (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. 17-7-
131 (West 2005); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-2 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-3
(West 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.120 (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36
(West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-103 (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (West 2005); 18
PA. STAT. ANN. § 314 (West 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-26-14 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16a-102 (West 2005)).
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not be released earlier, and will receive no more psychiatric treatment in
prison, than a prisoner convicted without any finding of mental
illness.”199
In 1962, the American Legal Institute (“ALI”), through the Model
Penal Code (“MPC”), developed a test based on Brawner that expanded
M’Naghten and the “irresistible impulse” test.200 “Under the ALI test, an
individual is not responsible for her criminal conduct if, because of
mental disease or defect, she either lacked ‘substantial capacity’ to
appreciate the ‘criminality’ (or . . . the ‘wrongfulness’) of her conduct,
or she failed to ‘conform’ her conduct ‘to the requirements of law.’”201
The ALI test, unlike M’Naghten, allowed a defendant who only suffered
a substantial, as opposed to a total, lack of mental impairment to suc-
cessfully plead not guilty by reason of insanity.202 Moreover, the ALI
test encompassed mental impairment that was not purely cognitive.203
In 1982, John Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity
in the attempted murder of President Ronald Reagan.204 The factfinders
for the Hinckley trial used the ALI test.205 Outrage over the verdict pro-
vided the catalyst for states and Congress to reaffirm the M’Naghten
test.206 In 1984, Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act and
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act; both narrowed the insanity
199. See Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347, 352–53 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing AM. BAR ASS’N,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.10, at 394 (1989); Fradella, supra note 37, R
at 30–31; Jennifer S. Bard, Re-Arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the Incarceration of
Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and Constitutional
Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to the Insanity Defense, 5
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 37–40 (2005); Robert D. Miller, The Continuum of Coercion:
Constitutional and Clinical Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons, 74
DENV. U. L. REV. 1169, 1186–87 (1997); Lynn W. Blunt & Harley V. Stock, Guilty but Mentally
Ill: An Alternative Verdict, 3 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 49, 63–64 (1985); Maura Caffrey, Comment, A
New Approach to Insanity Acquittee Recidivism: Redefining the Class of Truly Responsible
Recidivists, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 418–20 (2005)).
200. See Carol A. Rolf, From M’Naghten to Yates—Transformation of the Insanity Defense in
the United States—Is It Still Viable?, RIVIER C. ONLINE ACADEMIC J. (2006), https://
www.rivier.edu/journal/ROAJ-2006-Spring/J41-ROLF.pdf; see also Barbara A. Weiner, Mental
Disability and the Criminal Law, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 769–77 (Samuel Jan
Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985).
201. Denno, supra note 18, at 12 (citing Model Penal Code § 4.01 (1985)) (emphasis added). R
202. See id. at 12–13.
203. See id. at 12.
204. See This Day in History, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/hinckley-
not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
205. See From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley: A Brief History of the Insanity Defense,
PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crime/trial/history.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2015).
206. See id.; Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (requiring a defendant to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the commission of the offense the
defendant “was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts”); see
also Morris & Haroun, supra note 47, at 1002 n.189 (citing Lisa Callahan et al., Insanity Defense R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-3\MIA310.txt unknown Seq: 30  2-SEP-15 14:09
784 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:755
defense.207 New requirements included shifting the burden of proof for
proving insanity as a defense, raising the evidentiary standard for
insanity from a preponderance of evidence to clear and convincing evi-
dence, and reducing expert psychiatric testimony.208
The Supreme Court allows states to make their own insanity stan-
dards.209 Currently, the federal courts and a majority of states still use
the strict M’Naghten-type rule for insanity defense.210 A minority of
states utilize the ALI/MPC test.211 No states use the irresistible impulse
test alone.212 New Hampshire is the only state that follows the Durham
test.213 Four states—Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Utah—do not permit the
insanity defense at all.214
The public outrage over Hinckley’s not guilty by reason of insanity
verdict, even in the face of Hinckley’s obvious mental impairment,
illuminates the loaded political nature of insanity defenses within the
criminal justice system. Though the state is allowed to confine the
legally insane, and civil confinement can last longer than criminal pun-
ishment, legal insanity undercuts the normative function of most crimi-
nal trials, in which people who violate socially acceptable behavior are
Reform in the United States—Post-Hinckley, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 54
(1987)).
207. See 18 U.S.C. § 17; Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 2027 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 4241 and scattered sections).
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 17; 18 U.S.C. § 4241.
209. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 747 (2006) (finding an Arizona insanity test that differed
from M’Naghten to be constitutional).
210. For a summary of states utilizing the strict M’Naghten-type rule for insanity defense, see
Feinstein, supra note 198, at 563 n.11 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. ANN. R
§ 12.47.010(a) (West 1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(a) (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 25(b) (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-8-101, 16-8-101.5 (West 1986 & Supp.
1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.027 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-2, 16-3-3, 16-3-28
(West 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6 (West 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (West 1993);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (West 1987); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 546-14-101 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15
(McKinney 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(14) (West 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 1161 (West 1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 315 (West 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-
10(a) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(20) (1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (West
1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.12.010 (West 1988); State v. Hotz, 795 N.W.2d 645, 653
(Neb. 2011); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 76 (Nev. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002);
Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Miss. 1986); State v. Hartley, 565 P.2d 658, 660 (N.M.
1977); State v. Helms, 201 S.E.2d 850, 854 (N.C. 1974); Reid v. Taylor, No. 00-cv-00859, 2002
WL 31107536, at *13 (W.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2002)).
211. See AAPL Practical Guideline for Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation for Defendants
Raising the Insanity Defense, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L., no. 4, 2014, at S6, S8 (Supp.
2014).
212. See id. at S8.
213. See id. at S5; see also Rolf, supra note 200. R
214. See Marc W. Pearce, Insanity in the State of Idaho, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Feb. 2013),
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2013/02/jn.aspx.
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publicly excoriated and punished for their violation.215 Initially, mental
health experts were able to keep the insane within the rubric of moral
transgression; yet, over time, this normative element has dropped out of
the foreground of determining insanity in criminal trials as mental ill-
ness is now biomedically determined.
Despite the common social assumption that criminal defendants
often use the insanity defense to “get away” with their crimes,216 the
opposite is actually the case. Only approximately one percent of crimi-
nal defendants in felony cases raise insanity as a defense.217 Of those
who do raise the insanity defense, only 15–25% successfully receive a
not guilty by reason of insanity verdict.218
V. THE REEMERGENCE OF DEIFIC DECREE: 1983 TO PRESENT
A. Modern Jurisprudence
When State v. Crenshaw was decided in 1983, the question
presented to the Supreme Court of Washington was the same question
that Judge Cardozo faced in People v. Schmidt: the meaning of “wrong”
in the M’Naghten “right-wrong” test.219 Additionally, Crenshaw argued
that the jury instructions concerning insanity were in error.220 The court
disagreed with Crenshaw’s argument and refused to grant a new trial.221
Crenshaw presented the first opportunity for the Supreme Court of
Washington to define “wrong,” according to Washington state law. The
court noted: “it is society’s morals, and not the individual’s morals, that
are the standard for moral wrong.”222 However, the court resisted an
extensive engagement with the question of what constituted societal ver-
sus individual wrong, stating, “the law is, for the most part, an expres-
sion of collective morality,” so the interpretation of morality usually
does not matter.223 The court believed that the defendant knew that his
215. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the
Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1418 (2003).
216. See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 609–11 (1990) (discussing the
sensationalism of the insanity defense after M’Naghten and Hinckley’s acquittal).
217. See James L. Knoll, IV & Phillip J. Resnick, Insanity Defense Evaluations—Basic
Procedure and Best Practices, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Dec. 2008, at 35, 35.
218. Id.
219. See State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 490 (Wash. 1983); supra note 124 and R
accompanying text.
220. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 491.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 493.
223. See id. at 494. The dissent argued that the “majority eliminated the moral right and wrong
test by concluding that ‘moral’ wrong and ‘legal’ wrong are synonymous.” Id. at 499. For the
dissent, while this may sometimes be the case, it is for the trier of fact to determine and not for the
courts to determine as a matter of law. Id.
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acts were illegal and morally wrong from society’s viewpoint.224 Thus,
his personal belief that it was his duty to kill his wife was not enough to
exculpate him from criminal responsibility.225
Unlike the Supreme Court cases on religion, here, the court did not
engage the question of whether the defendant sincerely believed that
God told him to kill or whether his was a religious belief. Previously,
deific decree was framed as a way to make sense of cases in which a
supposedly sane person commits murder and then blames the murder on
God; that is, when a seemingly insane act appears out of nowhere. Here,
deific decree was only seen to make sense when there was a previous
history of mental illness. By alluding to social morality, the court did not
engage in an analysis of how social morality is learned or the assump-
tion that social morality is a unifying term, instead of a fractured one.
The court emphasized that under M’Naghten, the insanity defense
was strictly limited to people who had lost complete contact with reality:
Crenshaw’s bid for insanity was unsuccessful because, even if he was
delusional, “his delusion was only partial, for it related only to his per-
ceptions of his wife’s infidelity. His behavior toward others . . . was
normal.”226 The court refused to consider Crenshaw’s Moscovite beliefs
with respect to the insanity defense because his beliefs were not insane
delusions: “Some notion of morality, unrelated to mental illness, which
disagrees with the law and mores of our society is not an insane delu-
sion.”227 When the court mentioned Crenshaw’s Moscovite beliefs, it
did not go into detail about what those beliefs were, other than repeating
Crenshaw’s argument that Moscovites believed it their duty to kill
unfaithful wives.228 Moreover, the court characterized Crenshaw’s
thoughts as “beliefs” in order to draw a distinction between beliefs and
insane delusions.229 These beliefs occupy a middle ground between per-
sonal beliefs, which are held by Robert Crenshaw alone, and societal
beliefs, which are held by virtually everyone—including non-Mos-
covites. The court held that because Crenshaw’s belief that he should
kill his wife was a belief instead of a delusion, he should have been able
to reason out that he should not heed it.230 Thus, the court construed
M’Naghten so that anyone who might possibly be deterred from the
224. Id.
225. Id. at 494.
226. See id.
227. Id. at 495. The court also noted that Crenshaw’s belief that his wife was unfaithful was
not an insane delusion, and evidence of prior commitments to mental institutions is not proof that
one is legally insane. Id.
228. Id. at 494.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 494–95.
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commission of a crime should be included within the criminal law and
punished.
The court also rejected Crenshaw’s argument that he suffered from
a deific decree delusion.231 Citing Schmidt, the Crenshaw court stated
that it considered deific decree a “narrow exception to the societal stan-
dard of moral wrong” that “has been drawn for instances wherein a party
performs a criminal act, knowing it is morally and legally wrong, but
believing, because of a mental defect, that the act is ordained by
God.”232 This exception was unavailable to Crenshaw because Cren-
shaw argued only that he followed the Moscovite faith and that Mos-
covites believe it their duty to kill an unfaithful wife. This is not the
same as acting under a deific command. Instead, it is akin to “‘the devo-
tee of a religious cult that enjoins . . . human sacrifice as a duty [and] is
not thereby relieved from responsibility before the law.’”233 Crenshaw’s
personal Moscovite beliefs thus were not equivalent to a deific decree
and did not relieve him from responsibility for his acts.
The problem is that although Crenshaw cites to Schmidt, Judge
Cardozo in Schmidt actually used deific decree as the preeminent exam-
ple of the need for an insanity plea, not as a narrow exception.234 Also,
in Schmidt, Judge Cardozo noted that cults were unable to utilize the law
in the same manner as others because he did not believe them to be
recognized religions.235 By comparing the Moscovite faith to a cult and
citing to Schmidt, it seems as if the court was implying it was not a
recognized religion.
In the Colorado case of People v. Serravo, the defendant stabbed
his wife and then went to the grocery store.236 The defendant was found
not guilty by reason of insanity. The state appealed the verdict by argu-
ing that the standard for insanity in the jury instructions could have led
the jury to return an insanity verdict based on a purely subjective moral
standard, rather than a legal standard. The jury instructions stated:
As used in the context of the statutory definition of insanity as a
criminal defense, the phrase “incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong” includes within its meaning the case where a person appreci-
231. See id.
232. Id. at 501.
233. Id. at 494 (quoting People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915)).
234. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. R
235. See Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324 (“The devotee of a religious cult that enjoins polygamy or
human sacrifice as a duty is not thereby relieved from responsibility before the law. In such cases
the belief, however false according to our own standards, is not the product of disease. Cases will
doubtless arise where criminals will take shelter behind a professed belief that their crime was
ordained by God. . . . We can safely leave such fabrications to the common sense of juries.”)
(internal citations omitted).
236. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 130 (Colo. 1992).
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ates that his conduct is criminal, but, because of a mental disease or
defect, believes it to be morally right.237
The Colorado Supreme Court held that “‘incapable of distinguishing
right from wrong’ refers to a cognitive inability to distinguish right from
wrong under existing societal standards of morality rather than, as
implied by the trial court’s instruction, under a purely subjective and
personal standard of morality.”238 However, defendant may be consid-
ered insane where “the defendant’s cognitive ability to distinguish right
from wrong with respect to an act charged as a crime has been destroyed
as a result of a psychotic delusion that God has ordered him to commit
the act,” thus characterizing the deific decree delusion as an “integral
factor in assessing a person’s cognitive ability to distinguish right from
wrong with respect to the act charged as a crime.”239
The Colorado Appellate Court, in People v. Tally, followed Serravo
as precedent and stated that when an individual acts “under the delusion
that God is compelling the act, the so-called deific decree delusion, ‘is
not so much an exception to the right-wrong test measured by the
existing societal standards of morality as it is an integral factor in assess-
ing a person’s cognitive ability to distinguish right from wrong.’”240 In
Tally, even though the jury did not receive a specific deific decree
instruction,241 the general insanity instruction was sufficient.242
Though most of the deific decree cases of the post-1983 era
involved defendants with a history of mental illness, in State v. Turgeon,
the defendant had no such history.243 Christopher Turgeon argued that
“he [was] able to predict events and that he regularly receive[d]
237. Id. at 132.
238. Id. at 130.
239. Id. at 130, 142.
240. People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 184 (Colo. App. 1999) (citing Serravo, 823 P.2d at 139).
Washington also followed suit in considering the deific decree as an integral part of a general
insanity defense, not an exception. See, e.g., State v. Roberts, No. 29791-4-II, 122 Wash. App.
1040, at *4–5 (July 27, 2004) (finding that defense counsel’s failure to ask for a specific deific
decree instruction did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because the information on
deific decree was presented to a jury and the jury received a general instruction on insanity).
241. See Tally, 7 P.3d at 184. The defendant proposed the following instruction: “If Mr. Tally
committed the act under a delusion caused by mental disease or defect, that God had given him
permission to commit the act, he must be judged insane.” Id.
242. See id. The instruction given was: “INCAPABLE OF DISTINGUISHING RIGHT FROM
WRONG refers to cognitive inability, due to a mental disease or defect, to distinguish right from
wrong as measured by a societal standard of morality, even though the person may be aware that
the conduct in question is criminal.” Id.
243. State v. Turgeon, No. 49535-6-I, 120 Wash. App. 1050 (Mar. 22, 2004). Strikingly,
Turgeon is an unpublished case, and thus counsel in subsequent cases cannot cite to it as
precedent. Usually cases are unpublished if they are considered routine. However, in this case, the
court itself acknowledged the novelty of Turgeon’s position. See infra note 253 and R
accompanying text.
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messages from God. Because of this, he . . . devoted his life to teaching,
prophesying, and confronting others with their sins.”244 Turgeon led a
group called the Gatekeepers that robbed and defrauded businesses that
it considered sinful.245 During a Gatekeepers meeting, Turgeon and
Blaine Applin, another Gatekeeper member, alleged that God told them
that Dan Jess, a former member of the group that had argued against
Turgeon, “must be killed.”246 Thereafter, Turgeon and Applin drove
from California to Washington where Jess lived.247 On the way, Turgeon
claimed that he “asked God to make them take an unscheduled stop if
killing Jess was not God’s will.”248 Instead, the two men claimed that
they “saw seven rainbows, leading them to believe that God [had]
blessed their mission.”249 When Turgeon and Applin arrived at Jess’s
house, Applin shot Jess, and then the two men drove away.250 Both men
confessed to the murder but argued that they should be found not guilty
be reason of insanity because God had ordered them to murder Jess.251
Neither man was successful in their insanity defense, and both were con-
victed of first-degree murder.252
In Turgeon’s unsuccessful appeal, the Washington Court of
Appeals stated, “it is awkward to apply the insanity defense for someone
like Turgeon. Turgeon is not like the defendants in Crenshaw, Cameron,
or Rice, and the traditional insanity defense is likely inapplicable to
Turgeon because he is not insane in the traditional sense; he does not
suffer from mental disease.”253 Though Turgeon resembles the original
scenarios of deific decree, where the acts were isolated, here, the claim
of deific decree was deemed implausible. Given that the defendant had
no history of mental illness, it is probable that he was presumed to be
lying. If there was a defendant with a history of mental illness, deific
decree would be understood as an expression of that mental illness. The
question remains: is there any scenario in which an otherwise sane per-
son could actually believe that they heard a deific command, and if so,
how could the court verify the claim?
The court based its rejection of Turgeon’s appeal on the argument
that even if Turgeon did receive a command from God indicating an
element of mental disorder, his otherwise rational behavior demon-
244. Turgeon, 120 Wash. App. at *1.








253. Id. at *3.
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strated that his free will was not destroyed by the deific decree and thus
he did not reach the level of legal insanity.254 Thus, God was not a
strong enough moral force to cause total destruction to Turgeon’s facul-
ties, even though it was clear that he was relying on God to justify the
murder. If the court was trying to say that it did not believe Turgeon, it
did not have a mechanism to do so. A mental illness diagnosis allows
the court to indicate that a defendant’s beliefs are incorrect. Here, where
Turgeon did not have a history of mental illness and where his views on
God were unacceptable to the court, the court had it both ways—classi-
fying Turgeon as partially mentally ill, partially irrational, and wholly
responsible for the murder of Dan Jess.
B. Deific Decree’s Failure
1. BAD GODS
While the deific decree doctrine offers another alternative to some
people with certain delusions, others are not so lucky. Those who hear
the commandments of non-omnipotent deities, such as spirits,255 dev-
ils,256 Satan,257 or Jesus,258 may not be able to convincingly fit their
delusions within the narrow confines of a command by an omnipotent
unified deity. A deific decree defendant is legally understood to be act-
ing under the dictates of a good divine commander; thus, he believes
that what he is doing is morally right, even if it is legally wrong. Under a
volitional theory of insanity, these defendants are powerless to act other-
wise. For those who labor under other delusions, legally, they are under-
stood as having the choice to decline to act according to the dictates of
the delusion because Satan or another non-omnipotent deity does not
force them to choose between the morals of their religion and the legal
requirements of their society. This distinction between God delusions
and other delusions, though, does not track psychiatric understandings of
“delusion.” The DSM-5 does not recognize divine commands and does
not privilege religious commands in general.259 Instead, religious com-
mands are classified as part of an array of delusions that a person may
experience.260
On the other hand, deific decree can render often common religious
254. See id.
255. People v. Garcia, 509 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
256. People v. Duckett, 209 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98–99, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
257. Andrea Yates is a famous example. See Andrea Yates Case: Yates Found Not Guilty By
Reason of Insanity, CNN (Dec. 21, 2007, 11:03 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/12/11/
court.archive.yates8/index.html?_s=PM:US.
258. People v. Kando, 921 N.E.2d 1166, 1170 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
259. See DSM-5, supra note 158. R
260. See id. at 87.
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beliefs as insanity.261 For example, Deanna Laney killed two of her
children and tried to kill the third one in 2003.262 Laney said that God
told her that the Apocalypse was coming and that killing her children
was the final test.263 Laney also told investigators that God promised
that she would be reunited with her children in heaven and play an
important part in the Second Coming.264 These were not the first com-
munications that Laney claimed she received from God.265 She attended
a Pentacostal church run by her brother-in-law that frequently referred to
the Apocalypse and personal communications with God.266 No one at
Laney’s church remarked that these other messages were unusual.267 Yet
all five psychiatrists at her trial diagnosed her as mentally ill, and she
was found not guilty by reason of insanity.268 In another case, Teresa
Archie killed her daughter and said that she “had to do the Lord’s will”
because her daughter was worshipping Satan.269 Archie referred to Deu-
teronomy 13:6 and 7–8, which tells the devout to kill those who serve
other gods.270 Archie was also found not guilty by reason of insanity.271
A recent Seventh Circuit court opinion, Wilson v. Gaetz, warned of
possible Establishment Clause issues with deific decrees.272 In that case,
Wilson believed that Catholics were conspiring against him by planting
261. A 2014 Gallup poll revealed that, when asked about their views on the Bible, about 28%
of respondents believed that “the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word
for word”; other descriptive options included “inspired” but not the literal word of God and
“ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts.” Lydia Saad, Three in Four in U.S.
Still See the Bible as Word of God, GALLUP (June 4, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/170834/
three-four-bible-word-god.aspx. Other less scholarly and systematic surveys have reported much
higher figures. For example, the Rasmussen polling firm found that 63% of respondents answered
“yes” to the question, “Is the Bible literally true and the word of God?” 63% Believe Bible
Literally True, RASMUSSEN REP. (Apr. 23, 2005), http://legacy.rasmussenreports.com/2005/
Bible.htm.
262. See Caleb Mason, Faith, Harm, And Neutrality: Some Complexities of Free Exercise Law,
44 DUQ. L. REV. 225, 258 (2006).
263. See id. at 259.
264. See id. at 259, 260.
265. See id. at 259.
266. See id. at 258.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 260.
269. Archie v. Alabama, 875 So. 2d 336, 337, 343 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
270. See Mason, supra note 262, at 226. The text in question reads, “If thy brother, the son of R
thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine
own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods, which thou hast not known
. . . Thou shalt not consent unto him, nor hearken unto him; neither shall thine eye pity him,
neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou conceal him: But thou shalt surely kill him; thine hand
shall be first upon him to put him to death.” Id. (quoting Deuteronomy 13:6, 8–9).
271. See Archie, 875 So. 2d at 344.
272. Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347, 354 (7th Cir. 2010). The Seventh Circuit opinion
concerned a petition for writ of habeas corpus due to ineffective assistance of counsel that was
denied by the court. Id. at 358. It summarized the facts from the lower court in its opinion.
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cameras in his house in order “to frame him for molesting his adopted
teenage daughter.”273 Wilson thought that his daughter was a part of the
conspiracy and kicked her out of the house;274 he also divorced his wife,
believing that she not only was a part of the conspiracy, but that she had
affairs with Catholics.275 Wilson had tried to take steps to thwart the
Catholic conspirators, including buying toy and real guns, wearing a bul-
letproof vest, installing locks, and nailing his back porch door shut.276
Wilson experienced these delusions over the course of fifteen years.277
Ultimately, Wilson was put on trial for killing his boss, Jerome Fischer,
whom Wilson believed was one of the key conspirators.278 Wilson
thought that Fischer was planting the cameras in his home and suspected
Fischer of keeping him from his home in order to allow the Catholics to
plant more cameras.279 When Fischer told Wilson that he had to attend a
company meeting, Wilson told Fischer that he did not want to go to the
meeting because of the Catholic conspiracy.280 Fischer replied that he
would be fired if he did not attend.281 The next day, Wilson shot Fischer
when Fischer came to his house to pick him up for the meeting.282
Despite the “religious slant” of Wilson’s delusions, he could not
utilize the deific decree doctrine because he did not claim to receive a
direct command from God.283 “But to distinguish between ‘deific’ and
all other delusions and confine the insanity defense to the former would
present serious questions under the First Amendment’s establishment
clause.”284 However, no court, including the Wilson court, has directly
addressed whether the deific decree doctrine violates the Establishment
Clause.285
To go further, the deific decree not only expresses a religious pref-
erence, it expresses a particular type of religious preference in which
direct divine commands from an omnipotent God are recognized legally










283. Id. at 354.
284. Id.
285. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). Under the three-part Lemon test, a
law does not violate the Establishment Clause when it (1) serves a secular purpose; (2) does not
have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) does not promote “excessive
government entanglement with religion.” Id.; see also Feinstein, supra note 198, at 574. A R
violation of any prong could result in an Establishment Clause violation.
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apart from any other type of hallucination. The focus is not on the fact of
the hallucination or delusion and that the defendant was compelled by
the delusion; rather, it selects a particular type of compulsion for special
treatment. Moreover, though psychiatrists would analyze the defendants’
mental states, it is up to the legal system to determine whether defen-
dants’ delusions were divine. This is an entanglement of the legal system
into religion. Thus, the doctrine would likely fail under the Lemon test.
2. BAD MOTHERS AND BAD HUSBANDS
Finally, the pattern of cases involving deific decree raises gender
concerns. While in general these criminal defendants kill those who they
know, the cases fall into two main categories: women who kill their
children and men who kill their wives or girlfriends. Within the former
group, the case of Teresa Archie is exceptional.286 In most cases of pur-
ported deific decrees, women believe that their acts are protective of
their children, and that the children’s deaths will allow them to ascend to
Heaven and to God’s protection.287 We can often understand these cases
as ones not about deific decree but about the consequences of postpar-
tum psychosis. Postpartum psychosis, the most severe postpartum mood
disorder, which affects approximately 0.2% of childbearing women, is
“typified by hallucinations that command [the mother] to kill her child
and/or delusions that her child is possessed by the devil or by evil
forces.”288 The disorder, though, is often not discussed by the mother or
by others around her due to shame or ignorance.289 Moreover, postpar-
tum psychosis can persist and reappear periodically throughout the
woman’s life. For women who suffer postpartum psychosis in
M’Naghten jurisdictions, it would be difficult for them to receive a find-
ing of not guilty by reason of insanity because postpartum psychosis is
episodic, and the mother knows that it is wrong to kill her child. Moreo-
ver, the mother would have to fit into a narrow subset of postpartum
psychotic women who experienced a specific-command delusion in
order to qualify for deific decree.
The men who kill their wives or girlfriends do not have such a
straightforward psychiatric explanation. These men include Robert Pas-
qual Serravo, who stabbed his wife and claimed it was God’s will;290
Jesse Skinner, who strangled his wife and claimed that it was God’s
286. See Archie v. Alabama, 875 So. 2d 336 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). See also supra notes
269–71 and accompanying text. R
287. For example, Laney killing her children with the belief that her children would go to
heaven and be reunited with her. See Mason, supra note 262, at 259, 260. R
288. Bienstock, supra note 185, at 457–59. R
289. See id. at 460.
290. See State v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 131 (Colo. 1992).
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wish;291 and Robert Blair, who killed his wife and son with a hammer
and claimed God would have cast him into a lake of fire if he refused.292
For some of these men, their delusions were a manifestation of a mental
disorder, such as schizophrenia. For others, their actions may have been
the sane maneuvers of a domestic violence perpetrator who was attempt-
ing to use the deific decree doctrine to his advantage.
VI. CONCLUSION
Currently, deific decree is used as an attempt to broaden an insanity
defense regime that is distressingly narrow and does not reflect the mod-
ern understanding that people with severe mental illness or psychosis are
often not totally incapacitated.293 And, despite popular conception to the
contrary, insanity defenses are unlikely to succeed.294 Meanwhile, hun-
dreds of thousands of people with diagnosed mental disorders languish
in jail cells instead of receiving treatment.295
This article charts a doctrine that becomes increasingly incoherent
as time goes on. As the mental health field developed, it carved out a
niche for itself within criminal law, created a biomedical framework to
map out human behavior, and confusingly tried to incorporate cultural
factors within its analysis. The Supreme Court, through constant engage-
ment with the First Amendment, broadened its definition of religion to
include more than Christianity, and deferred into perpetuity questions,
like what is a religion, what role should it have in society, and how
should the law define and assess religious belief. Criminal law, thrown
back upon an insanity doctrine developed in England in the mid-1800s,
attempts to categorize wrongs based on societal and individual defini-
tions, but sidesteps the problem of religion when it occupies both fields.
291. See People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 754–55 (Cal. 1985).
292. See State v. Blair, 732 A.2d 448, 449 (N.H. 1999).
293. Ranade, supra note 186, at 1397. R
294. See Knoll & Resnick, supra note 217. R
295. “‘On any given day, at least 284,000 schizophrenic and manic depressive individuals are
incarcerated, and 547,800 are on probation . . . . [W]e have unfortunately come to accept
incarceration and homelessness as part of life for the most vulnerable population among us.’”
Bard, supra note 199, at 2 (quoting The Impact of Mentally Ill Offenders on the Criminal Justice R
System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 106th Cong. 26–27 (2000) (statement of Rep.
Ted Strickland)).
